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"What unites Western culture in all its phases, tying in with the ambiva-
lence that produces the continuity of change, is a series of
demythologizings and consequent 'losses of faith'-some gradual, some
traumatic. Nothing is so characteristic of our traditions, with the result
that we can say more truly of Western culture than of almost anything
else, 'plus 9a change, plus c'est la m6me chose.' The Western world, in
short, uses up myth at a tremendous rate, and often has to borrow fran-
tically from other cultures, or to allow the cultural changes and oscilla-
tions that "time and chance" will bring but which mythological societies
will manage to dampen effectively"
- Herbert Schneida, The Sacred Discontent
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I. INTRODUCTION
George Catlin's early nineteenth century painting of Mandan warriors
engaging in the Sun Dance ceremony framed later non-Native Americans'
cultural references and their understanding of Native American ceremonial
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practices as self-brutalizing, sanguinary and possibly anti-Christian.' IHis
painting depicts the warriors in a state of near ecstasy, their bodies hoisted
aloft in mid-air by ropes slung over the center pole of the earthlodge and
attached firmly to skewers embedded in the flesh of the warriors' chests.
The warriors' supporters are depicted drumming and chanting in a day and
night long vigil, while the blood courses down the warriors' bodies as
each is urged by his supporters to be strong and seek his personal vision
of his life's significance and meaning.2
Catlin, along with other American and European painters, sought to
preserve authentic, sometimes first-hand, cultural images of a soon-to-be
vanished indigenous people.' These artists were convinced, as were early
1. George Catlin was the first American artist to visit and live in the early 1830's with the
Mandans in their earthlodges in the Upper Missouri River valleys. His well-known portraits of
Mandan chiefs and every-day life in a Mandan village, along with his famous "notes on the Indians,"
provided Americans and Europeans with an appreciation of the complexity and beauty of Great Plains
Indians' ceremonial and cultural practices. See generally GEORGE CATuIN, LEFrERs AND NOTES ON
THE AMEICAN INDIANS (Michael Macdonald Mooney ed., 1975).
Catlin's description of the Mandans' "O-kee-pa" ceremony evidences an artist's eye for detail
but a Christian's mind for interpreting Mandan ceremonial activities within a wholly religious frame of
reference. He concluded that there were three distinct "objects" for Mandan ceremonial practices:
First, they are held annually as a celebration of the event of the subsiding of the Flood,
which they called Mee-nee-ro-ka-ha-sha (the sinking down or settling of the waters).
Secondly, for the purpose of dancing what they call Bel-lochk-na-pic (the bull dance); to
the strict observance of which they attribute the coming of buffaloes to supply them with
food during the season.
Thirdly, for the purpose of conducting the young men of the tribe, as they reach manhood,
through an ordeal of privation and torture. It is supposed to harden the muscles and prepare
them for extreme endurance. It also enables the chiefs to decide upon their comparative
bodily strength and ability to endure the extreme privations and sufferings that often fall to
the lots of Indian warriors. The chiefs also decide who is the most hardy and able to lead a
war party in case of extreme exigency.
Id. at 190-91 (emphasis in original).
2. The young Mandan initiates would fast for 4 days and nights in preparation for the ceremo-
ny. The flesh of each man's breast was pierced by a knife that had been "notched with the blade of
another to make it produce as much pain as possible." Id. at 199. A splinter or skewer was inserted in
the incision and "two cords were lowered from the top of the lodge.., which were fastened to these
splinters or skewers, and they instantly began to haul the aspirant up." Id. at 200. "He was raised until
his body was suspended above the ground, then the knife and a splint were passed through the flesh in
a similar manner on each arm below the shoulder (over the brachialis externus), below the elbow
(over the extensor carpi radialis), on the thighs (over the vastus externus), and below the knees (over
the peroneus)." Id. Each of these Mandan men were raised until suspended in midair and "blood was
streaming down their limbs, the bystanders hung upon the splints each man's appropriate shield, bow
and quiver." Id. Catlin's reaction to this scene was personal and graphic:
Several of them, seeing me make sketches, beckoned me to look at their faces, which I
watched through all this horrid operation without being able to detect anything but the
pleasantest smiles as they looked me in the eye, while I could hear the knife rip through the
flesh, and feel enough of it myself to start uncontrollable tears down my cheeks.
Id.
3. See AMERICA'S FASCINATING INDIAN HERITAGE: THE FIRST AMERICANS: THEIR CUSTOMS,
ART, HISTORY AND How THEY LivED, (James A. Maxwell ed., 1978) for richly illustrated historical
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American anthropologists such as Lewis Henry Morgan, that the Mandans'
Sun Dance ceremony as well as the traditional cultural practices and tra-
ditions of the other Great Plains Indian tribes, would soon be extinguished
by United States' military forces or the hostile beliefs and values of those
missionary societies that had been federally licensed to civilize the Native
Americans.' For these groups, eradicating the Indians' barbaric and hea-
then ceremonial practices, including the Sun Dance, from the cultural
vocabulary of their Native American charges was an explicit goal.'
Thus, federal policy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
sought unapologetically to eradicate the Native Americans' ancient values
and ceremonies, the constitutional principle of governmental
accommodation of religious free exercise notwithstanding. During that
period, it would have been inconceivable to suggest that the federal
government's power to systematically undermine the Native Americans'
cultural institutions and belief systems could be restrained, based upon the
government's duty to protect an individual's free religious exercise; equal-
ly inconceivable would have been the notion that the government was
constrained from establishing a federal religion.6
Recently, however, the National Park Service has emerged as an ally
of Native American traditional cultural practitioners who wish to conduct
their traditional ceremonies on public lands In February of 1995, Super-
accounts of Native American cultural practices.
4. See PETER FARB, MAN'S RISE TO CIVILIZATION AS SHOWN BY THE INDIANS OF NORTH
AMERICA FROM PRIMEVAL TIMES TO THE COMING OF THE INDUSTRIAL STATE 6 (1968).
5. The cornerstone strategy of President Grant's post Civil War "Indian Peace" policy was to
assign control of the various Indian agencies to Christian missionaries. Grant's policy was born out of
the "highest" of motives: to depoliticize a corrupt Indian bureau; to promote the civilization of the
Indians; and to spread the Gospel among "barbaric and heathen" tribal peoples. I FRANCIS PAUL
PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 512-
27 (1984). Grant's method for assigning the Indian agencies to the clamoring Christian denominations
was intended to reward those "religious denominations as had heretofore established missionaries
among the Indians ... ." Id. at 516. This distribution engendered competition from those denomina-
tions, particularly the Catholics, that alleged they were being excluded and wanted the Indians to be
able to choose which Christian denomination they wanted to manage their agencies. See Id. at 523.
6. Father Prucha concludes that "religious liberty was not very broadly conceived in
nineteenth-century America." PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 524. The various Christian ministries acted in
"complete disregard for the religious views and the religious rights of the Indians themselves." Id. The
literal warfare between rival religious denominations to control the Indian agencies forced Interior
Secretary Carl Schurz in 1881 to declare that Indian reservations would be open to all religious de-
nominations except where the "'presence of rival organizations would manifestly be perilous to peace
and order' or where treaty stipulations would be violated." Id.
7. Ms. Renee Stone, the National Park Service's (NPS) Chief of Staff, points to the NPS'
sharing of management responsibilities with the Lakota Sioux for the South Unit of Badlands National
Park as example of its accommodation of Native Americans' cultural and economic access claims to
our nation's parks. Todd Wilkinson, Native Americans Challenge Park Agency for Land Rights,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MoNrrOR, Oct. 22, 1996, at 1. She also notes the NPS accommodation of the
Timbishas Indians when decades ago, it allowed them to occupy 40 acres of land in Death Valley. Id.
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intendent of Devils Tower National Monument, Deborah Liggett adopted a
management plan that sought to grant greater access for Native Americans
to practice culturally significant summer solstice ceremonies, such as the
Sun Dance After analyzing the impact of the substantially increased and
uncontrolled recreational rock climbing,9 and lengthy consultation and
discussion with interested stakeholder groups, she adopted a management
plan that, among other things, denied commercial rock climbing licenses
during June only, so as to mitigate that burden on Native Americans'
cultural use of Devils Tower National Monument.'"
To be sure, this action was not embraced by all. Some of the dissent
took the form of a lawsuit challenging the decision as a constitutionally
barred governmental establishment of religion in the federal district court
of Wyoming in Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt." This district
court proceeding, in which the court found for the plaintiffs and granted
an injunction against implementation of the management plan, provides
the initial focus of this article. In analyzing both the issues addressed and
discarded by the district court, this article seeks to set the management
plan in its broader context and emerge with a thoughtful and fair solution
to the use of public lands and its connection to our country's collective
cultural heritage. 2
8. Superintendent Liggett relied on newly instituted cross-cultural educational and interpretive
programs, as well as moral and ethical suasion by the mainstream climbing community, to eventually,
persuade all recreational rock climbers to voluntarily forego ascents on Devils Tower from June 1 to
June 30, beginning 1995. She hoped that over a multi-year period, this voluntary compliance program
would result in a "continuous significant reduction in the number of climbers on Devils Tower each
June" and in an "[increased awareness] among all monument visitors of the cultural significance of
Devils Tower to American Indians .... " U.S. DEP'T. OF THE INTERIOR, NATIoNAL PARK SERvICE,
ROCKY MOUNTAiN REGION, FINAL CLIMMING MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR DEVILS ToWER NATIONAL
MoNUMENT 23 (1995) [hereinafter FCMP]. Liggett emphasized that the voluntary closure could be-
come mandatory if the interim management efforts were unsuccessful in achieving its goals. Id. at 23-
24. The closure zone is described as including "all areas inside the loop of the Tower Trail" Id. at 22.
9. The elders of the Dakota, Nakota and Lakota Nations issued a resolution that denounced the
continuing damage to Devils Tower by rock climbers who have pounded "hundreds of steel pins ...
into the face of this Sacred Site .... Id. at 9. They urged the National Park Service to protect Devils
Tower from further destruction by tourists, hikers and rock climbers. Id. A 1991 ethnographic report
recommended, among other things, that the National Park Service prohibit climbing on the tower and
act to preserve the ethnographic resources in future management plans. Id.
10. Superintendent Liggett concluded that, although it is within her power to close park areas to
activities in order to protect natural and cultural resources, it was preferable "that self-regulation by
climbers, augmented by the cross-cultural education program" be utilized to achieve management
goals. Id. at 24. She asserted that the Solicitor of the Department of Interior advised her that this ac-
tion would not violate the constitutional rights of any citizen. Id.
11. No. 96-CV-063-D (D. Wyo. June 8, 1996) (Order granting, in part, Plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Order], at 11.
12. Devils Tower was determined eligible for the National Register of Historic Places as a
traditional cultural property for its American Indian relationships. A traditional cultural property is
protected "because of its association with cultural practices or beliefs of a living community that a) are
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The district court's decision presents obstacles to accommodating
Native Americans' contemporary ceremonial and cultural practices that
will likely influence the fate of future administrative and legislative
initiatives. 3 These obstacles are threefold. They are first political, in that
the decision inappropriately chills future administrative and legislative
implementation of appropriate strategies to preserve Native Americans'
contemporary cultural and ceremonial use of our nation's public lands.'
Second, they are managerial, insofar as the decision narrows public land
managers' discretion to accommodate conflicting recreational and preser-
vation uses of public lands.15 Lastly, the obstacles are interpretive, in that
the district court's interpretation of the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses 6 does not accord with the Supreme Court's evolving judicial
understanding of those clauses, an interpretation which permits public land
managers to accommodate Native Americans' contemporary cultural and
ceremonial use of our nation's public lands."1
rooted in that community's history and b) are important in maintaining the continuing cultural identity
of the community." FCMP, supra note 8, at 11.
The cultural resources that Superintendent Liggett acted to protect include the butte known as
Devils Tower, which is "a sacred site to many American Indians of the northern plains." Id. at 37. The
on-going Native American ceremonial and cultural events at Devils Tower include prayer offerings,
vision quests, the leaving of prayer bundles, sweatlodge rites and the Sun Dance. Id. She relied on a
1991 ethnographic overview and assessment that showed that six Indian nations inhabited this region
and considered the site to be sacred. These tribes or nations include the Wind River or Eastern Sho-
shone, Kiowa, Crow, Cheyenne, Arapaho and Lakota. Furthermore, approximately 23 Indian tribes
have been identified as culturally affiliated with Devils Tower. Id.
13. The NPS is confronting growing Native American claims for cultural and other forms of
access to those national parklands that have been carved out of their ancestral lands. Some of these
Native American groups have united to form the Alliance to Protect Native Rights in National Parks.
Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 1. This alliance includes the Timbishas of the Mojave Desert, the
Miccosukees of the Florida Everglades, the Pal 'Ohana of Kaloko-Honokohau National Historical
Park, the Hualapai on the edge of the Grand Canyon National Park, the Navajos near Canyon de
Chelly and five Sandoval Indian Pueblos. Id. The size of this alliance is expected to grow substantially
over the next few years. Members of Montana's Blackfeet Tribe have sued for use of Glacier National
Park. Id.
14. This potential chilling effect was evidenced by the nation-wide video conference of manag-
ers, convened by the NPS in August of 1996, with regard to the injunction issued by Judge Downes in
the Devils Tower litigation. This conference's main topic was how the various managers should react,
in light of this injunction, to President Clinton's recent executive order directing the NPS and other
federal agencies to ensure Native Americans' access to sacred sites on public lands.
15. Professor George Coggins emphasizes that public natural resources law "was deeply im-
printed with a tradition of judicial deference" to federal land managers' actions and decisions. GEORGE
C. COGGINS, Er AL., FEDERAL PUBIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAw 253 (3d ed. 1993). He explains
this traditional judicial deference as an acknowledgement that many land management decisions in-
volved "complex factual and technological questions with which the courts have little or no expertise."
Id.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cI. 1 & 2.
17. See infra notes 139-155 and accompanying text (discussing public land managers' authority
to accommodate religious use of public lands). The NPS defends its periodic closure of Devils Tower
to commercial rock climbing based on its unique statutory duties to Native American peoples. Brief
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This article shall examine these obstacles by first delineating the
historical and current importance of Native American cultural resources to
our national heritage. It will then examine the regulatory context in which
a federal public land manager makes management decisions. Next, it will
examine the Bear Lodge litigation and the district court's interpretation of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. It will conclude with a proposal for
the preservation of Native American cultural resources on public lands in
the next century.
II. RE-ASSESSING THE PLACE OF NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL
REsoURCEs IN OUR NATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE
Cultural resources provide a people with an historically derived sys-
tem of explicit and implicit designs for living a shared meaningful life as
a member of a community. Native Americans' unique ceremonial and
cultural beliefs and practices provide their members with a personal and
societal compass and gyroscope that helps guide them through what some
non-Indians may regard as a world of pure facticity and random phenome-
na.'
8
A. Excluding Native American Cultural and Ceremonial Practices
from Legal or Constitutional Protection
The Native Americans' long struggle to preserve their traditional
cultural and ceremonial practices must be viewed against the backdrop of
our nation's struggle to develop a coherent national cultural preservation
policy. This cultural preservation effort's lack of success is the product of
two interrelated forces. First, commentators have cited the United States'
perceived sense of cultural inferiority to their European cousins as deter-
ring any concerted legislative action to preserve our young nation's histor-
for United States in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 10-13, Bear Lodge
Mult. Use Ass. v. Babbitt, (D. Wyo. 1996) (No. 96-CV-063-D) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
Defendants' Brie]. The agency's government-to-government relationship with the Native American
peoples includes an obligation to preserve their unique cultural identity, which is important to effectu-
ating tribal sovereign status. Id. at 10. The NPS must also preserve, pursuant to the National Historic
Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1994), the "traditions, beliefs, practices, lifeways, arts, crafts and
social institutions of any community," including an Indian tribe, which is affiliated with protected
property that is listed on the National Historic Register. Id. at 12. Devils Tower is an important histor-
ic site primarily because of its long-standing cultnal affiliation with those Native American groups
that use the site for ceremonial and cultural purposes. Id. Moreover, the NPS has a duty, under its
federal trust relationship with the tribes, to protect their interest. See infra notes 188-201 and accompa-
nying text (discussing trust relationship and duties).
18. See generally Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Voices in Historic Preservation: Sacred Landscapes,
Cross-Cultural Bridges, and Common Ground, 21 VT. L. REV. 145 (1996); Scott Hardt, Comment,
The Sacred Public Lands: Improper Line Drawing in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Analysis, 60
U. CoLO. L. REv. 601 (1989).
1997]
12 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
ic and cultural heritage from destruction. 9 This perception arguably in-
hibited Americans of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
from thinking of themselves as the inheritors-as did their contemporary
Western Europeans-of a valued cultural legacy that was worthy of legis-
lative protection."° Many Europeans, in contrast to their American cous-
ins, engaged in public and private concert to preserve their inherited artis-
tic, architectural and aesthetic artifacts, traditions and values.2
Contemporary American thinkers conceived of a distinctly American
"culture" as a temporally distant project.' Its creation would require the
"creative destruction" of the surrounding wilderness and the progressive
displacement of those aboriginal peoples who resided thereinY Only a
few American voices in the 1840s and 1850s-most notably Henry David
Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson-decried America's seeming obses-
sion with the destruction of those irreplaceable cultural and social resourc-
es embodied in what most Americans regarded as an impenetrable and
foreboding Indian-dominated wilderness.24
19. See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural
Property in the United States, 73 B.U. L. REV. 559, 574 (1995).
20. The American belief that we have little cultural property worth protecting stems from the
dominant culture's almost exclusive identification with its European ancestry. This fact, coupled with
the dominant culture's seeming de-valuation of America's significant indigenous cultures and tradi-
tions, resulted in what a leading commentator has called a "historyless Western Hemisphere." Id. at
562 n.4. Alfred Kroeber, a leader in the new cultural anthropology school of thought, wrote in 1948:
[l]n the historyless Western Hemisphere, everything pre-Caucasian seemed not so much
strung on a long thread of sequence as it seemed one great amorphous mass of data, alike
only in that they all preceded Caucasian history. All the data here seemed 'old' but the
question of how old, or how much older than others, did not at first obtrude.
Id. (quoting ALFRED L. KROEBER, ANTHROPOLOGY: RACE, LANGUAGE, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY, PRE-
HiSTORY 774 (1948)).
21. See Gerstenblith, supra note 19, at 562-3.
22. The Founding Fathers arguably viewed America as a blank slate that provided an unrivalled
opportunity for democratic and social experimentation so as to create a new society that was untainted
by the religious wars that had devastated and fractured European society. Id. at 560.
23. The Americans' "yearning for a European and Mediterranean-based past" caused them to
ignore the value of indigenous peoples' cultures and traditions. There was no idea in early America
that an American cultural value could grow "autochthonously from th[e] soil" and be symbolized by
the Native Americans' ceremonies, traditions and artifacts that pre-dated the advent of Europeanism.
Id.
24. Wilderness is valued by Emerson, according to Max Oelschlaeger, as an "occasion for the
individual mind first to discover a reflection of itself (nature as a system of laws, concepts, and com-
modities) and then to confirm God's existence." MAX OELSCHIAEGER, THE IDEA OF WILDERNESS 135
(1991). Thoreau's valuation of nature rejected Emerson's physico-theologic view that sought to discov-
er purpose and final cause in nature. See id. at 170-71. Thoreau's maturing vision of the American
wilderness lead him to accept that wilderness is defined by a "brute facticity... [in which] even
[man's] own material body within which his consciousness existed, could be alien." Id. at 149. He
came to condemn Emerson's philosophy, which countenanced the human mission "like so many busy
demons, to drive the forest all out of the country, from every solitary beaver-swamp, and mountain-
side, as soon as possible." Id. at 150.
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Second, the Americans of that era did not generally value contempo-
rary Native American ceremonial practices and traditions as cultural re-
sources that were worth preserving as a irreplaceable part of our shared
national heritage. This view was not held solely by frontierspeople who
viewed the "Indian as wolf," but by influential federal Indian policy mak-
ers and by the emerging social scientific communities as well.'s
These influential thinkers viewed efforts to preserve the Native
Americans' contemporary ceremonies and cultural practices as both im-
practicable and imprudent. Lewis Henry Morgan, the father of modem
anthropology, contributed an ostensible social scientific rationale in the
1870s for the federal government's destruction of indigenous "tribalism"
and the programmatic assimilation of qualified individual Native Ameri-
cans as American citizens.' His writings suggest that Native American
societies were stuck at a lesser stage of human development because they
were burdened by barbaric customs, traditions and belief systemsY
Federal Indian policy makers of the 1870's and 1880's readily inter-
preted Morgan's writings as justifying the systematic eradication of indige-
nous tribal cultural and social institutions so to facilitate the successful
incorporation of individual tribal members as American citizens. They
assumed that the Native Americans' traditional cultural structures and
belief systems deterred individual tribal members from successfully assim-
ilating into the larger American society. Federal Indian policy in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is largely a record of the con-
scious destruction of Native American institutions of "tribalism," including
the sometimes violent suppression of the Native Americans' traditional
25. George Washington described his federal Indian policy as based on the "expediency of
being upon good terms with the Indians" and intended to gradually extend non-Indian settlement into
Indian lands. DAVID GETcHES Er AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 96 (3d ed. 1993). Washington contended
that the Indian would retreat deeper into wilderness because the Indians are like "beasts of prey tho'
they differ in shape." Id.
26. Native American "tribalism," from the American viewpoint, encompassed three inter-related
elements: 1) the Indians' military capability to resist dispossession of their lands; 2) the Indians' struc-
tore of self-governance which included their ceremonial and cultural values; and 3) their national sov-
ereignty which bound them together as identifiable peoples. STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE
NATnvr AMERIcAN INDIAN PoLrcAL RESURGENCE 45 (1988). The federal government's late nine-
teenth century Indian policy sought to destroy each aspect of Native American tribalism. Id. at 45-6.
27. All human societies were required to progress, according to Morgan, through seven stages
of civilization: lower savagery, middle savagery, upper savagery, lower barbarism, middle barbarism,
upper barbarism, and finally civilization. FARB, supra note 4, at 6. Peter Farb, a leading American
cultural anthropologist, describes Morgan's view as ego-centric and now generally discredited in favor
of a modem culture anthropology that does not rank cultures and societies on a European denominated
scale of civilization. Id. at 6-7 But Farb admits that only recently has American anthropology and
ethnography recognized that Native American cultures "are something more than patchworks or hap-
hazard end products of history." See id. at 8. Farb notes that Americans slowly appreciated that Native
American societies represented "all stages of human society from simplest kind of band up to the
complex state." Id.
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ceremonial and cultural practices."
Many European and American artists, writers and social scientists
responded to this systematic destruction of Native American cultures by
rushing to the Great Plains to witness, and perhaps briefly be part of the
indigenous tribal societies and cultures that they believed would soon
vanish. But Native American cultural beliefs and ceremonial practices
proved far more durable and resilient than expected.29
Ironically, those artistic and scientific interests paired with federal
policies that forced the Native Americans' ceremonial and cultural practic-
es underground during the Indian Reservation Period of the 1870s to the
1930s, had the unintended effect of strengthening the Native Americans'
hold on the new generations of reservation-born Native American adher-
ents. Today, these ancient Native American cultural and ceremonial prac-
tices are enjoying a renaissance among many Native American adherents,
from both urban and reservation settings."0
B. Awarding Legal Protection to Selected Native American Artifacts and
Culturally Significant Places
Frederick Jackson Turner is credited with alerting white America to
the need to preserve the culturally significant remnants of our fabulous
frontier history and culture." His "end of the American frontier" thesis of
28. See Sharon L. O'Brien, Freedom of Religion in Indian Country, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 451,
454-56 (1995).
29. The re-vitalization of Native American cultural and ceremonial practices during the Indian
Reservation Era (1870 to 1934) resulted in the growth of Native American apocalyptic and syncretic
cultural movements. A Paiute Indian named Wovoka popularized a cultural re-awakening of Native
Americans that became known as the Ghost Dance. One version counseled the Indians to work hard
and live in peace with the Whites. Adherents would eventually be re-united with their long dead loved
ones as a reward for their following the disciplined and peaceful Red Road on earth. But the Sioux
and Pawnee gave Wovoka's vision an apocalyptic and hostile twist. Whites would soon be swept away
in a great cataclysm and the Buffalo would again return in vast herds to the Plains. It was this version
of the Ghost Dance that alarmed the perhaps understandably anxious members of the newly re-con-
stituted Seventh Cavalry and contributed to the 1890 massacre at Wounded Knee. CORNELL, supra
note 26, at 62-67.
30. Cultural resources represent the real power in Native American and other human societies.
The reservation Indians leveraged belief, custom and interpretation so as to retain those three elements
of "tribalism" that federal Indian policy had vowed to destroy. As both conservative and innovative
tools, the reservation Indians were able to deploy a wide-array of ceremonies, practices and traditions
that re-affirmed a coherent Indian role and identity in a sea of non-Indian inflicted change. Id. at 66-7.
31. Turner's The Significance of the Frontier in American History influenced a generation of
Progressivist thinkers who struggled to come to terms with the closing of the American frontier.
Among Turner's students at Harvard, for example, was Farrington R. Carpenter, the first director of
the Interior Department's Grazing Division. Carpenter had the unenviable task of implementing the
real closing of the frontier by persuading America's cattlemen to cooperate in regulating the former
open public range under the Taylor Grazing Act. WILIAM K. WYANT, WESTWARD IN EDEN: THE
PUBLIc LANDs AND THE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 311 (1982).
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1890 confronted Americans with the stark realization that Americans must
now conserve those resources once imagined as boundless and inexhaust-
ible. This reality of a finite American world forced Progressivists of the
early twentieth century to focus upon preserving those shared common
resources that private parties had hitherto exploited mercilessly without
regard to future consequences.32
In contrast, the need for cultural preservation was virtually ignored by
those early Progressivist thinkers. Gifford C. Pinchot, the champion of the
early conservation movement, focussed on a utilitarian rationale for pre-
serving our common lands from unbridled private use and development. 33
Even John Muir's broader-gauged conservation philosophy advocated
legislative protection of only those significant aesthetic, and distinctly non-
human, features of America's remaining wilderness. 4
Neither Pinchot nor Muir sought to preserve the Native Americans'
cultural values or traditions as part of our nation's common preservation
heritage. Undoubtedly both likely assumed that the question of guaranteed
cultural access of Native Americans to their traditional and accustomed
ceremonial sites on America's public lands was moot. The Muir/Pinchot
debate understandably kept preservationists' attention on the practical and
ethical dimensions of the debate-whether wilderness preservation or the
utilitarian development of America's common resources would best serve
the Americans' long-term interests.
Pressure to preserve Native Americans' ancient cultural values and
artifacts through legislative enactment originated from a very different
professional community than those represented by Pinchot or Muir. Ram-
32. Gifford C. Pinchot's appointment as head of the Division of Forestry in 1898 until he left
his position as Chief of the Forest Service in 1910, marks what some historians refer to as the "Golden
Era" of conservation history. SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K. FAmRFAx, FOREST AND RANGE POLI-
CY: ITS DEVELOPMENr IN THE UNrrED STATES 69-71 (2d ed. 1980). Conservation for Pinchot was a
broad-gauged "wise use" utilitarian-based philosophy that included prudent preservation of all valuable
aspects of natural resources. Id. at 72.
33. Pinchot embodied the social and economic ideals of the Progressivist brand of conservation.
His genius lay in taking "old ideas and often made suggestions" and elaborating them into a natural
resources management program. Id. at 96.
34. John Muir was the "product of a hard scrabble youth" on a Midwest homestead. Id. at 45.
His preservationist philosophy emphasized the reservation of areas of natural beauty from private
development. However, as a practical matter, it is hard to distinguish the conservationists from the
preservationists in the early twentieth century because they were united in their efforts to stop the
destruction of our public lands and resources. Id.
35. The famous Hetch Hetchy controversy exposed the division between Muir and Pinchot over
the future direction of the American conservation effort. Id. at 108-9. Muir opposed the construction of
the reservoir that would flood a portion of Yosemite Valley in order to provide municipal water sup-
plies to San Francisco. Pinchot, although not a direct proponent of the project, did side with those San
Franciscans who sought the water supplies and electric power that the dam and reservoir would pro-
vide. lId. Although Muir lost this battle, he later won the war with the passage of the act establishing
the National Park System in 1916. Id.
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pant vandalism of ancient Southwestern Native American burial and ar-
chaeological sites in the late nineteenth century dismayed and outraged the
new social scientists in the emerging disciplines of anthropology, archaeol-
ogy and ethnography.36 These new professionals agitated for federal stat-
utory protection of the irreplaceable scientific and cultural data and knowl-
edge embodied in the countless Native American artifacts, burial sites, and
architectural structures located on public lands throughout the West.37
Forceful federal legislation would provide the only effective means
for preserving the irreplaceable scientific data contained in these ancient
Native American sites, artifacts and burial mounds. Absent such legisla-
tion, this scientific data regarding ancient Native American peoples and
their cultures would be lost forever to grave robbers and looters." A
thriving black market motivated the routine vandalization of these sites for
marketable Mesoamerican artifacts, pottery and human remains that were
highly prized by private collectors and public museums.39
Congress responded to the social scientists' outcry for statutory pro-
tection of these ancient Native American sites and artifacts in 1906 with
the passage of the Antiquities Act.' That act authorized the President to
set aside public lands deemed to contain unique scientific, historical or
aesthetic data or values.4' Devils Tower was the first national monument
set aside by a President under the authority of that act.42 Seeking to deter
vandalism and destruction of ancient Native American sites on public and
36. American interest in Native American cultural resources is dated from the Smithsonian
Institution exhibition in Philadelphia at the Centennial Exposition of 1876. That year also witnessed
the founding of two important social scientific organizations: the Anthropological Society of Washing-
ton and the Archaeological Institute of America. Lewis Henry Morgan was later elected president of
the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Gerstenblith, supra note 19, at 577.
Gerstenblith notes a dichotomy in American cultural resources preservation law and policy, in that the
majority culture seeks to preserve those European-based elements of our society based on respect for
the past, but seeks to preserve Native American cultural resources for economic and scientific motives.
Id. at 578.
37. Id.
38. Grave robbers and looters quickly grasped that money could be made in Native American
artifacts and human remains, given the burgeoning archaeological and scientific interest that resulted in
public and private museums' competition to quickly develop their Native American collections. Id.
39. Id.
40. Pub L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1994)). The act
authorizes the President to declare as national monuments "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric
structures, and other objects of scientific interest" that are located on public lands. 16 U.S.C. § 431. In
addition, it punished the unauthorized private destruction, excavation, appropriation or injury of any
historic or prehistoric ruin or monument or object of antiquity. § 433.
41. Id.
42. The 1347 acre site known as Devils Tower National Monument is located in Crook County,
Wyoming, in the northeast comer of that state. FCMP, supra note 8, at 2. Proclaiming Devils Tower,
that "lofty and isolated rock," as a National Monument was Theodore Roosevelt's first withdrawal
under the Antiquities Act. Richard M. Johannsen, Public Land Withdrawal Policy and the Antiquities
Act, 56 WASH. L. REv. 439, 452 n. 93. (citing Pres. Proc. No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (1906)).
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Indian lands, the act provided criminal sanctions for those individuals who
looted, excavated or otherwise damaged such sites without prior federal
permission.43
The vagueness of the Antiquities Act's criminal provisions, however,
coupled with the lack of adequate federal enforcement staff and funding,
severely undermined its effectiveness as a cultural preservation law.'
Despite the inadequacy of those provisions, Congress did not until recently
strengthen the protection for archaeological resources, by enacting the Ar-
chaeological Resources Protection Act, which significantly increased the
criminal penalties and fines that the act's violators confront.45
Most of these Native American cultural preservation statutes are
directed at protecting inanimate objects-scientific data and ancient arti-
facts preserved because of their scientific significance and utility to non-
Native American scientific or aesthetically interested communities. This
may be at least partially because none of the earlier Native American
cultural preservation statutes provided for Native American participation in
the planning or administration of federal programs or projects that have
significant impact on protected Native American cultural resources.
Superintendent's Liggett's periodic closure of Devils Tower to commercial
rock climbing stands in striking relief to these existing programs and pro-
jects. At long last, a federal public land manager has sought to preserve
the living culture of contemporary Native American communities.'
43. See 16 U.S.C. § 433.
44. Gerstenblith observes that the act intended to promote the scientific investigation of ancient
Native American sites and to ensure that legitimate museums, rather than untrained amateurs, excavat-
ed archaeologically or anthropologically significant Native American sites. Unfortunately, amateur
excavators and looters of ancient Native American sites were not, in fact, much deterred by the act's
minor criminal and civil penalties or the lax federal enforcement of that act. GERSrENBLrrH, supra
note 19, at 579.
45. Desultory federal criminal prosecutions in the 1970s of unauthorized grave robbers and pot
hunters under the Antiquities Act sometimes resulted in convictions and sometimes not. Compare
United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974) (reversing a conviction on the grounds that the
Antiquities Act was unconstitutionally vague as applied, since no reasonable person could discern the
meaning of "ancient" artifacts within the statute's context) with United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939
(10th Cir. 1979) (affirming convictions because artifacts were clearly "ancient," being some 800 to
900 years old). Congress responded by enacting the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979,
Pub. L. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721 (1979) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (1994)).
46. The recent enactment of the Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub.
L. No. 101-106, 104 Stat 3052 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994)), somewhat modi-
fies the Native American cultural preservation law. Federal museums must now inventory their Native
American collections and notify affected Indian tribes of any skeletal or other human remains or arti-
facts that are derived from that tribal culture. Tribes may request their return for appropriate tribal
administration. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 19, at 584.
47. Superintendent Liggett's action was taken in compliance with Congress' mandate to pre-
serve Native American cultural use of Devils Tower as a "historical, architectural or [site of] cultural
significance at the community, state or local level." See Watch v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310, 321 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979); see also National Historical Preservation Act (N-PA), 16
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The controversy surrounding Superintendent Liggett's management
plan exemplifies the land managers' dilemma in carrying out their newly
imposed preservation duties under statutes such as the National Historic
Preservation Act.' Only recently have public land managers come to
grips with their obligation to consult and work with affected Native Amer-
ican communities in carrying out regulatory and project related activities
affecting Native Americans' cultural and historical resources. 9 Native
American governments and user groups had historically been ignored
regarding agency-sponsored projects or planning affecting the cultural or
historical resources of tribal peoples. Some land managers, as well as
some social scientists, have decried the recent addition of Native American
consultation to the management process as disruptive and unnecessary."0
U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470W-6 (1994). NHPA's purpose is to preserve America's historic and cultural re-
sources. See Indiana Coal Council, Inc. v. Lujan, 774 F. Supp. 1385, 1387 (D.D.C. 1991). The NHPA
has emerged as the cornerstone of America's cultural preservation policy.
48. The 1992 amendments to the NHPA require that Superintendent Liggett's preservation-
related activities be "carried out in consultation with the affected tribes." See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)
(1994). The NHPA also requires land managers to "take into account the effect" of their "undertak-
ings" on anything "included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register" and afford the Advi-
sory Council on Historic Preservation a reasonable opportunity to comment on the undertaking. 16
U.S.C. § 470f. Furthermore, the NHPA requires managers to "assume responsibility for the preserva-
tion of historic properties" under their control by: 1) establishing preservation programs to ensure
identification, evaluation and protection of the historic properties; 2) ensuring such properties are man-
aged and maintained in a manner that considers the preservation of their "historic, archeological ....
and cultural values;" and 3) ensuring that preservation-related activities are carried out in consultation
with "Federal, State, and local agencies, Indian Tribes, [and] Native Hawaiian organizations carrying
out historic preservation planning activities." 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2 (listing numerous other related du-
ties).
49. The new duties of preservation and consultation with Indian tribes imposed on federal pub-
lic land managers undoubtedly complicates their managerial lives. But in balancing cultural preserva-
tion duties with an agency's pre-existing mandate, public managers are given considerable discretion-
ary leeway. However, that discretion is limited by the statutory factors set out in the NHPA. See Ely v.
Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971) ("Discretion to decide [under NHPA] does not include a
right to act perfunctorily or arbitrarily.").
50. See Walter E. Stem & Lynn H. Slade, Effects of Historic and Cultural Resources and Indi-
an Religious Freedom on Public Lands Development: A Practical Primer, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 133,
153 (1995). However, other public land managers have genuinely sought to develop working relation-
ships with affected Native American communities. Superintendent Liggett's creation of a Devils Tower
working group that included affected Native American communities, representatives of the recreational
climbing community, and local governmental and economic interests represents one example of a
public land manager's effort to comply with the broadened consultation requirements of the NHPA.
FCMP, supra note 8, at 1, 8, 88.
Ms. Ramona Hutchinson, a research historian at Mesa Verde National Park, cites agency staff-
ing and funding constraints as significantly limiting the effectiveness and value of the consultation
process with Native Americans, as well as other stakeholders in the preservation and protection of
significant cultural and historic resources on public lands. The downsizing of the professional staff
within the NPS, and the increased reliance on contract providers of historical and ethnographic re-
search, have likewise slowed the progress of the consultation process with affected Native American
groups and communities. Telephone Interview with Ramona Hutchinson, Research Historian, Mesa
Verde National Park, Colorado (June 16, 1997).
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Superintendent Liggett's attempt to manage this tectonic shift in the
National Park Service's mission prompted her to engage affected Native
American communities in the management of Devils Tower's unique
historic and cultural resources. Accordingly, in the preamble of the Devils
Tower Final Climbing Management Plan (FCMP), she cited her cultural
and historic preservation duties as the legal and practical rationale for
imposing regulatory limits on recreational rock climbing.51
mH. ASSESSING THE CONTEXT OF THE DEcISION TO PERIODICALLY
CLOSE DEvILs TOWER TO COMMERCIAL ROCK CLIMBING
Cultural resources are a newly-recognized public asset that must be
managed by public land managers just as they manage any other entrusted
public resource and value. But the National Park Service has long func-
tioned under a specific preservation mandate that arguably obligates it to
preserve Native American cultural resources even in the absence of its
"new" preservation mandates.
A. Examining the National Park Service's Uneasy Role
as a Preservation Agency
The periodic closure of Devils Tower to commercial rock climbing
should be viewed against the backdrop of the National Park Service's
evolving cultural and historic preservation duties and policies, rather than
the checkered judicial history of the Establishment Clause.52 Superinten-
dent Liggett's regulatory effort to accommodate both recreational rock
climbing and Native Americans' cultural access to Devils Tower can and
should be resolved with regard to well-established public land law princi-
ples.53
In 1916, Congress in its foresight recognized the National Parks'
vulnerability to existing and future conflicting user demands, and entrusted
the National Park Service with the authority to allocate those resource val-
ues between conflicting recreation and preservation demands5 4 The
51. FCMP, supra note 8, at 2-3. Recreational rock climbing is acknowledged as a legitimate
public use of Devils Tower but that use is subject to regulation given its demonstrated adverse envi-
ronmental and inconsistent use character. lId
52. See John IL Garvey, Is There a Principle of Religious Libeny?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1379
(1996) (describing that checkered history).
53. Professor George Coggins concludes that public natural resources law was "deeply imprint-
ed with a tradition of judicial deference to actions taken by land management agencies... [because
public resource allocation decisions involve] complex factual and technological questions with which
the courts have little or no expertise." CoGGINs, supra note 15, at 253.
54. The 1916 Organic Act that created the National Park System represents Congress' "be-
grudging[]" step to consciously preserve America's remaining wilderness resource. But the act im-
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evolving and intractable tension instilled by these twin mandates has
forced the National Park Service to periodically re-visit and refine its
accommodation strategies, given its duty to promote recreational use of
the parks and to preserve those areas in an unimpaired state for future
generations of Americans.5"
Commentators have long criticized the National Park Service's over-
emphasis of the recreational prong of its statutory mandate at the seeming
expense of its co-equal preservation duties under the second prong of that
mandate.56 In retrospect, Stephen Mather's "master builder" emphasis on
promoting tourist and recreational uses of the National Parks in the 1920s
and 1930s pragmatically exploited the changing leisure time needs of the
newly entrenched American middle class. By the late 1920s, Americans
were becoming a people on wheels, as automobile ownership came within
the economic reach of many American workers. Mather's bargains with
railroad barons, hotel and service concessionaires, and the early automo-
bile users associations built public support for the National Parks as the
playing fields of the average American.57
Mather's utilitarian tilt of his agency's mission toward tourism and
recreation uses alienated many preservation advocates both inside and
outside of the National Park Service.58 But even his critics conceded that
he was very successful in building a broad base of public support for the
growing National Park System.59 Some critics have argued that he was
perhaps too successful, because his utilitarian emphasis caught the agency
unprepared to deal with the ecological and preservationist revolutions of
the 1970s and the 1980s.6
One authority contends that Congress' imposition of new ecologic
posed a "seemingly contradictory set of preservation and recreation" duties on the fledgling NPS. See
AMERICA'S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM: THE CRITICAL DOCUMENTS 2 (Larry M. Dilsaver ed., 1994)
[hereinafter DISAVER].
55. Id. at 2-4.
56. The first Director of the NPS, Stephen Mather, considered it "democratic and prudent" to
promote public use of park units. Id. at 53. But Mather's "anthropocentric idea" of wise use arguably
led to wanton destruction of other park resources. Id. at 54-55.
57. Mather viewed as his responsibility the expansion of the National Park System, and he was
a "zealous[] crusader" for this goal. DANA & FAIRFAX supra note 32, at 109. His three major allies in
this effort were the railroads, the newly established American Automobile Association, and conces-
sionaire interests. Id. at 110. Dana and Fairfax conclude that the goal of "preservation... was re-
placed by a commitment to tourism." Id.
58. Id.
59. Mather is viewed as the Park Service's "Pinchot," except that he was "less irascible."
Mather was "extremely effective in building congressional and public support for his fledgling agen-
cy." DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 32, at 111.
60. The mounting pressure to diversify the NPS to include preservation and recreation goals
strained the system and required continual reinterpretation and adjustment of its goals and mission.
DR.SAVER, supra note 54, at 269-70.
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and preservation duties on the National Park Service transformed the
agency's underlying mission and goals.61 These new duties stimulated the
employment of new staff professionals-ethnographers, anthropologists,
and ethnohistorians-whose task is to re-orient the agency's mission to-
ward the development of ecological and preservation focussed programs
and management plans.62 These new preservation duties have likewise
forced the National Park Service to forge new government-to-government
relationships with many affected Native American tribes and communi-
ties.'
In view of the increased use of the National Parks, this new agency
emphasis on its ecological and cultural preservation mission may be inevi-
table. Recreational rock climbing, for example, has gone unregulated,
despite growing environmental alarm about its adverse impacts on physi-
cally limited and highly vulnerable areas such as Devils Tower."
Although the National Park Service has long debated system-wide
regulation of recreational use of public land, Superintendent Liggett's
regulation of recreational rock climbing is the agency's first managerial
response to the adverse environmental and cultural impacts of that
sport.' It represents the initial response by the National Park Service to
broad-scale cultural shifts in recreational demands by non-Native Ameri-
can users of public lands.
B. Recreational Rock Climbing as a New Public Use Demand
at Devils Tower
The phenomenal growth in the number and frequency of recreational
rock climbers at Devils Tower testifies to the emergence of a significant
new recreational user group that is contesting for its fair share of public
61. Id. at 372. President Nixon, for example, signed Executive Order No. 11593, which
strengthened the N-PA and required the NPS to take additional steps and expend resources to protect
cultural and historical resources within its jurisdiction. Id.
62. See, e.g., Jane H. Kelley & Ronald F. Williamson, The Positioning of Archaeology Within
Anthropology: A Canadian Historical Perspective, AMERICAN ANIQUTy, Jan. 1, 1996, at 5 (describ-
ing the consultation work of the Cultural Resources Section of the NPS).
63. The 1992 NHPA amendments require that the NPS carry out its preservation duties in "con-
sultation with [affected] Indian tribes." Stem & Slade, supra note 50, at 137 (citing NHPA, 16 U.S.C.
§ 470a(d)(2)).
64. See FCMP, supra note 8, at 3-13.
65. Professor Joseph Sax has criticized the NPS' failure to develop a coherent recreational
management policy for our national parklands. See Joseph L. Sax, Fashioning a Recreation Policy for
Our National Parklands: The Philosophy of the Choice and Choice of Philosophy, 12 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 973 (1979). Sax would doubtless sympathize with that agency's struggle to accommodate recre-
ational rock climbing among the panoply of other permitted public uses of our parks. But he would
expect the agency to come to grips, as Superintendent Liggett has attempted to do at Devils Tower,
with regulating that use consistent with the agency's co-equal preservation mandate. See id.
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land resources.' The explosive growth of this new recreational sport at
Devils Tower is meticulously catalogued in the FCMP.67
This growth in recreational rock climbing may be explained by the
convergence of two factors. First, this sport's growth may reflect the tech-
nological advances in equipment that reduces the individual skill level
necessary to make a successful ascent of a forbidding natural structure
such as Devils Tower." Second, this sport's growth may reflect the gen-
eral diffusion of training sites and educational opportunities that enable
high school and college students to become competent technical climbers
as an alternative leisure time pursuit.69
C. Revitalizing Native Americans' Cultural and Ceremonial Access
to Public Lands
Superintendent Liggett's regulatory action responds to the Native
Americans' entitlement to reasonable cultural access to Devils Tower so
that they may continue their long-standing ceremonial use of that sacred
site, particularly during the summer solstice month of June. The Native
Americans' demand for cultural access to Devils Tower may reflect two
significant trends in contemporary Indian Country. First, many Native
American communities have sought to re-vitalize their traditional Native
American ceremonial values and practices as a means of combatting sig-
nificant social problems among their members, such as drug or alcohol
abuse.7" Second, Native American youth in both reservation and urban
settings have re-asserted their interest in understanding and participating in
their once suppressed Native American cultural and ceremonial heritage.7
By no means do these ad hoc observations fully explain the underly-
ing social or cultural influences that drive large-scale changes in
Americans' choice of leisure time pursuits or in revitalization movements
66. See FCMP, supra note 8, at 4-5.
67. The substantial growth in recreational rock climbing and the accompanying adverse envi-
ronmental and aesthetic effects at Devils Tower required Superintendent Liggett to take action. See id.
at ii-iii.
68. For example, power rock drills aided in the development of new routes on Devils Tower
and similar natural climbing structures that were once considered "unclimbable." Id. at 12.
69. Rock climbers pursue their sport for a variety of reasons. Some climbers describe the pure
physical challenge of climbing Devils Tower, while others enjoy a sense of psychological and spiritual
satisfaction in reacbing the summit of Devils Tower. Id. at 4-5.
70. Native American cultural and ceremonial practices became a vehicle for promoting inter-
tribal social interaction and exchange. Stephen Cornell emphasizes the "affiliative" features of this
revitalization movement as laying the basis for fostering intertribal linkages and providing common
frameworks of belief for diverse Native American groups. Contemporary intertribal pow-wows and
ceremonial gatherings reinforce shared cultural identities and values that undergird a pan-Indian polit-
ical and organizational consciousness. CORNELL, supra note 26, at 110-11.
71. See id.
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within indigenous cultures. But Superintendent Liggett, as well as other
land managers, can undoubtedly attest that our public lands have become
the theater of conflict for historic and emerging user groups.'
D. The Legal Basis for the Final Climbing Management Plan for Devils
Tower National Monument
Superintendent Deborah Liggett, like other public land managers,
routinely confronts difficult managerial choices that require the accommo-
dation of competing uses of her statutorily entrusted public resources. Her
managerial task at Devils Tower National Monument differs only in the
nature of the conflicting public uses she must accommodate. She must
manage recreation and preservation-related demands now that the Monu-
ment has become a premier rock climbing site because of the numerous,
challenging and breath-taking technical climbing routes and experiences it
offers to the rock climbing public;73 and it is a major historic ceremonial
and cultural site for Native Americans for their performance of the ancient
Sun Dance ceremony, sweatlodge practices and personal vision quests.74
These factors must also be weighed with Superintendent Liggett's statuto-
ry duty to regulate the increasing and demonstrably severe environmental
impacts of unregulated recreational rock climbing on Devils Tower75 and
her duty to preserve the Native Americans' right of cultural access to
Devils Tower.76
Settled public land law principles grant land managers wide discre-
tionary latitude in striking a reasonable balance to accommodate compet-
ing public uses of a entrusted public resource such as Devils Tower. 7
72. Just a small sample of the many newspaper articles, op-ed pieces and letters to the editor
generated by the Devils Tower litigation reveals the nature of this conflict. For example, Bob
Archbold, a member of the task force that helped draft the FCMP, said that he was "saddened that
some commercial climbers chose not to refrain from climbing" even though he believed most climbers
supported the voluntary closure of Devils Tower. Devils Tower Ban, RAPID CITY J., June 11, 1996, at
Al, A2. But other non-Indians disagreed with Archbold. Perry Pendley, President of the Mountain
States Legal Foundation, contended that the climbers' voluntary compliance with the closure request
was a product of governmental threat to make the closure mandatory if the climbers did not voluntari-
ly comply. Still other non-Indians, such as Steve Moore of the Native American Rights Fund, argued
that long-term leases granted to mainstream religious denominations in national parks would be jeop-
ardized by Judge Downes' ruling. Christ Tollefson, Commercial Guides Win Round, CASPER STAR
TRmB., June 11, 1996, at Al, As.
73. See FCMP, supra note 8, at 4-5.
74. Id.; Tollefson, supra note 72, at Al.
75. See generally id.
76. The federal defendants cite several statutes and an executive order as obligating the NPS to
preserve and protect the unique cultural resources of the Native American peoples. Defendants' Brief,
supra note 17, at 10-13.
77. Stem and Slade describe the NHPA as not an "action forcing" statute, but as imposing
procedural duties on the NPS, and similarly situated federal agencies, to promote the preservation of
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The environmental and physical facts about Devils Tower demonstrate
why Superintendent Liggett deserves such regulatory latitude. Her regula-
tory action seeks to mitigate the demonstrably adverse environmental
impacts of recreational rock climbing on a uniquely vulnerable and heavily
visited area.78 Colliding public uses in a constrained area like Devils
Tower require that she be granted managerial discretion.79
Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants in Bear Lodge disagree that
Superintendent Liggett has been delegated wide regulatory discretion to
manage recreational rock climbing and Native American ceremonial uses
of Devils Tower." The conflict lies in whether she may limit commercial
rock climbing one month of the year to accommodate Native American
cultural uses of Devils Tower.8
E. Superintendent Liggett's Effort to Build an Overlapping Consensus
Regarding the Management of Devils Tower
The FCMP for Devils Tower is the product of Superintendent
Liggett's lengthy consultation with potentially antagonistic user groups re-
garding future management alternatives for Devils Tower.82 She brought
together recreational rock climbers and Native American ceremonial prac-
titioners to develop a preferred management plan for Devils Tower. She
relied on expert advice from ethnologists and historians to develop cross-
cultural educational and interpretive programs to inform the general visit-
ing public about Devils Towers' historic connections with Native Ameri-
can ceremonial practices and cultural beliefs.8 3
Her consultative goal was to build a consensus that would support the
long-term implementation of the major environmental and cultural preser-
vation goals of the FCMP.84 Having the major stakeholder groups agree
about the need for future regulation of recreational rock climbing for envi-
identified historical and cultural resources. Stem & Slade, supra note 50, at 139. However, courts have
interpreted these procedural duties as mandatory in nature. Id. at 139-40.
78. See FCMP, supra note 8, at 30-37.
79. The federal defendants assert that the FCMP serves important secular purposes, including
regulation of climbing activity, management of conflicting public uses, and preservation of histonc
cross-cultural resources. Defendants' Brief, supra note 17, at 20.
80. The plaintiffs agree that the federal government can mitigate burdens that are imposed on
minority religious practitioners so long as it does not violate the Establishment Clause. Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 3, Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n
v. Babbitt, (D. Wyo. 1996) (No. 96-CV-063-D) (on file with author).
81. Plaintiffs contend that the FCMP goes well beyond the accommodation of Native American
cultural practices, and amounts to a governmental endorsement of a particular religion. Id. at 4-5.
82. When Superintendent Liggett created a Climbing Management Plan Work Group, she in-
cluded representatives of key stakeholder interests. FCMP, supra note 8, at 88.
83. Id. at 15-16.
84. See FCMP, supra note 8, at 8, 46.
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ronmental and preservation purposes provided a community-derived yard-
stick for a rational and reasonable management plan for Devils Tower.'
This working group included official representatives of the recreation-
al rock climbing community, affected Native American governments or
communities, and local governmental and economic development offi-
cials.' This group had the opportunity to work with agency managers
and scientific consultants to develop a long-term management plan that
reconciles recreational uses and preservation values of Devils Tower."
The working group's differing viewpoints on resource management
goals converged in its general acceptance of a preferred management
alternative that would mandate periodic closure of Devils Tower to com-
mercial, but not private, recreational rock climbing. The working group's
deliberations were informed by its extensive access to relevant scientific
and ethnographic data regarding the Native American cultural resources
that should be preserved in the management plan for Devils Tower. The
working group's contribution toward selection of the management alterna-
tives represents the major stakeholders' efforts toward a long-term accom-




Standard public land law principles support Superintendent Liggett's
periodic closure of Devils Tower to commercial rock climbing. Her action
was taken in consultation with a representative working group of recre-
ational climbers, Native American ceremonial practitioners, local govern-
mental and economic interests, and environmental groups. Superintendent
Liggett, like other public land managers, confronted the unenviable task of
allocating entrusted public resources among a growing list of competing
public users. She must also preserve Native Americans' cultural traditions
and practices, as well as those of similarly situated ethnic and local com-
munities, under her agency's historic and newly-imposed preservation
mandates.
85. Superintendent Liggett's action was informed by her concern about the adverse environ-
mental impacts of recreational rock climbing at Devils Tower and the burdens imposed on Native
American cultural use of that site. Stem and Slade note that such an agency consultation process,
under the NHPA, intends to inform participants about the nature of the properties at issue and the
potential impacts of proposed management plans. Stem & Slade, supra note 50, at 146-51.
86. FCMP, supra note 8, at 88.
87. See id. at 7-8.
88. Id. at 9.
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IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TO THE ISSUE
OF NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC LANDS
A. Factual Context of the Final Climbing Management Plan
In February 1995, the National Park Service issued its FCMP for
Devils Tower in response to a tremendous increase in the rate of technical
climbing and the corresponding need to protect the park's resources from
degradation. 9 To effectuate this purpose, the preferred alternative, which
was adopted as the FCMP, included the following provisions: no new
bolts or fixed pitons'e will be allowed on the Tower, access trails are to
be rehabilitated; camouflaged climbing equipment will be required; and
certain routes will be closed seasonally to protect raptor nests.9 ' The
FCMP also discontinued the award of commercial climbing licenses for
the month of June and encouraged recreational climbers to refrain from
climbing during this period of cultural importance to Native American
northern plains tribes.' No restrictions are imposed on the general visit-
ing public, who may continue to use all the facilities at Devils Tower even
during the month of June. Only commercial climbers that hold inherently
revocable licenses granted by the Superintendent are mandatorily restricted
during the month of June under the FCMP.'
Private recreational rock climbers are asked to voluntarily refrain
from climbing Devils Tower so as to allow Native American ceremonial
practitioners greater peace and solitude in which to perform their historic
summer solstice ceremonies.94 Such a request is consistent with the
National Park Service's long standing support for Christian ministries in
the Parks, by allowing the ministries to use park structures and other facil-
ities that are otherwise used for naturalist or interpretive programs.95 Su-
89. FCMP, supra note 8, at 1-4.
90. These are the trappings of technical climbing which are left in the rock.
91. Id. at iv-v, 22-29.
92. Id. at 22-23. The Park gave all commercial licensees a one year advance notice that, begin-




95. In fact, a comprehensive Christian Ministry supplies the National Parks with 300 seminari-
an interns each year. To LivE OVER THE STORE, ESSAYS ON THE EXPERIENCE OF A CHRISTIAN MINIS-
TRY IN THE NATIONAL PARKS (William L. Baumgaerlner ed., 1992). In view of this accommodation of
the Christian Ministries, it is possible that a failure of Superintendent Liggett to develop a policy to
accommodate the contemplated Native American use would be found discriminatory. It may also indi-
rectly contravene the federal government's fiduciary trust duty to Indian tribes. Articulated as the
"trust doctrine" in the common law, this responsibility has been found to require the United States to
protect Indian culture. See O'Brien, supra note 28, at 479-83. The courts have found that "[t]he ex-
istence of a trust duty between the United States and an Indian or Indian tribe can be inferred from the
provisions of a statute or regulation, 'reinforced by the undisputed existence of a general trust relation-
ship between the United States and the Indian people."' Id. at 479 n.179 (citing United States v.
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perintendent Liggett expected that the ethical suasion of mainstream rock-
ing climbing associations, combined with a broader cross-cultural educa-
tion program regarding Native Americans' historic ceremonial and cultural
uses of Devils Tower, would eventually convince virtually all recreational
rock climbers to forego climbing the monument during the month of
June.9
But the long-term plan to accommodate both recreational rock climb-
ing and Native Americans' ceremonial use of Devils Tower was interrupt-
ed one year into its operation. Several commercial and private rock
climbing interests sued to enjoin the periodic suspension of commercial
licenses, alleging that such actions constituted a "subsidy of the Indian
religion," an excessive governmental entanglement with religion, and thus
violated the Establishment Clause.' Judge Downes ruled the prohibition
of commercial guides violates the Establishment Clause," and found that
the proposal to close Devils Tower to all climbing in June, if the volun-
tary closure fails to significantly reduce climbing, amounted to a threat
that was governmentally coercive of individual action and conduct in favor
of Native American religious activities."
B. The Theoretical Inconsistencies of the District Court's
Unbounded Establishment Clause Standard
To reach his holding, Judge Downes implicitly characterized the
Native Americans' use of Devils Tower as primarily religious. According-
ly, he goes on to articulate the prevailing Establishment Clause test from
the Supreme Court's 1971 decision, Lemon v. Kurtzman, but never applies
it."°o Instead, he relies entirely upon the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n.. and the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Badoni v. Higginson," both of which turned upon
the interpretation of the right to religious free exercise. Thus he effectively
abolished any governmental opportunity to accommodate Native American
or other minority religious beliefs or practices.
Assuming the accuracy of Judge Downes' characterization of Native
Americans' use of Devils Tower as primarily religious, the government's
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983)); see also infra notes 188-201 and accompanying text.
96. FCMP, supra note 8, at 22.
97. Complaint, Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, (D. Wyo. 1996) (No. 96-CV-063-D)
(on file with author), at 9.
98. Order, supra note 11, at 11.
99. Judge Downes found the voluntary program was "laudable and constitutionally permissi-
ble." Id. at 14.
100. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
101. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
102. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
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duty to accommodate and preserve Native Americans' cultural access to
Devils Tower remains. Therefore, if Native Americans' use is not primari-
ly religious, °3 law addressing religious practice is of questionable appli-
cability to the Bear Lodge case. However, even assuming that the activity
is primarily religious, Judge Downes failed to apply the appropriate con-
stitutional analysis.
Judge Downes' analysis relied almost entirely upon free exercise ju-
risprudence, presumably because he considers the Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses to be coextensive. The Supreme Court has never deter-
mined that to be the case. Indeed, the Court has found "room for play in
the joints, productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit reli-
gious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference."'"
The Court has found ample room within the Establishment Clause for state
and federal governments to act in ways that accommodate religious free
exercise."° Contrary to Judge Downes' analysis, governmental acts need
not be totally unrelated to religion since that "would amount to a require-
ment 'that the government show [a] callous indifference to religious
groups.
'''06
Judge Downes' only nod to Establishment Clause jurisprudence was a
recitation of the test from Lemon v. Kurtman which by popular account
remains only nominally controlling."° Indeed, it may be said to have
been supplanted by the Supreme Court which has recently focussed its
attention on factors of governmental endorsement of religious activity and
governmental coercion of religious belief"e Judge Downes never dis-
cusses this trend nor applied the resultant tests to the facts of the case.
Thus Judge Downes' errors were three-fold: first, never applied the
Lemon test to the facts of the case; second, he ignored the evolving gov-
ernmental coercion and endorsement standards championed particularly by
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, respectively; and third, he proceeded to
apply analyses crafted for free exercise questions. While the first and third
error constitute a clear rejection of the established tests, the second exem-
103. See generally Hardt, supra note 18 (discussing white America's ignorance of the interde-
pendence of Native American religion and culture).
104. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
105. "The limits of permissible state accommodation of religion are by no means coextensive
with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 673.
106. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
107. William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal Pro-
tection and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 227, 238 n.48 (1995) (noting that the court did
not consistently apply the Lemon test to establishment issues in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993), Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783 (1983)). Marshall refers the reader to Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 795 (1993), "for an account that Lemon has been effectively overruled."
108. See infra notes 123-138 and accompanying text.
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plifies an exceeding narrow understanding of the state of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Certainly not an enlightened path for the protection
of the rights of religious minorities, the resultant opinion leads the law not
into the future, but ties it to a repressive past.
1. The Lemon Test
The three-part test for Establishment Clause case analysis derived
from Lemon v. Kurtzman"1° asks whether the challenged governmental
action: 1) has a secular legislative purpose; 2) advances or inhibits reli-
gion; or 3) fosters excessive governmental entanglement with the reli-
gion.1
°
The first prong requires the government to demonstrate a secular
purpose in undertaking the challenged action."' This prong exemplifies
the Court's understanding of the government's secular, constitutional re-
sponsibility to accommodate religious practices or beliefs that are protect-
ed under the Free Exercise Clause. Indeed, governmental actions that
reasonably accommodate individuals' rights to free exercise of their beliefs
merely fulfill the governments' secular constitutional duties."' Thus, the
secular purpose prong ensures that governments are not placed in the
impossible cross-fire of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses by
allowing them to craft accommodative policies that preserve religious
freedoms within constitutional parameters." 3
The second prong of the Lemon test focuses upon the governmental
action's "primary effect" and asks whether that effect advances or inhibits
religion or religious practice." 4 This prong is not violated by govern-
mental action that incidentally advances or advantages religious activity; it
only prohibits governmental action which directly sponsors or furthers
specific religious activity."5
Governmental action that regulates religious organizations' access to
public property must be even-handed and must not favor non-religious
109. 403 U.S. 602.
110. Id. at 612-13.
111. Id. at 612.
112. See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
113. See Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), where the Court found that an Arkansas
statute that required creationism to be taught whenever evolution was taught did not have the purport-
ed secular purpose of advancing academic freedom, but rather fostered a "discriminatory preference for
the teaching of creation science and against the teaching of evolution." Devoid of a secular purpose,
the statute failed to satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 588.
114. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
115. Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 337. "[Flor the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment, the 'establishment' of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign .... Id. (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 668).
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organizations' access to public facilities. For example, the Court has found
that state universities which grant access to and use of their property to
solely non-religious organizations, while barring access to and use by
religious organizations, discriminate unfairly against religious interests." 6
In the public high school context, where the potential for students to be
pressured into an activity is great, the Court has determined that Estab-
lishment Clause requires solely voluntary attendance at religious meetings
during non-school hours, and bars school officials from actively partic-
ipating in such meetings at public high schools."7 Such prudential limits
ensure that voluntary, non-governmentally required participation is the
standard for such religious use of public facilities.
The third prong of the Lemon test focuses upon excessive govern-
mental entanglement with private religious activity."8 This prong is now
relatively insignificant in the Court's evaluation of alleged excessive gov-
ernmental involvement with religious groups or action." 9 This is because
the federal and state governments rarely directly fund or participate in the
inner management of private religious activity."
Superintendent Liggett's accommodation of Native Americans' cultur-
al use of Devils Tower does not violate any of the three prongs of the
Lemon test. The secular purposes of the closure are many: environmental
protection, raptor conservation, and recreation management. Additionally,
given that the governmental accommodation of free exercise is also a
secular purpose, the closure clearly satisfies the first prong of the Lemon
116. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
117. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (finding constitutional the Equal Access
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1994), which bars secondary schools who receive federal funds and
maintain a "limited open forum" from curtailing students' "equal access" to facilities based upon "reli-
gious, political, philosophical or other content"). The Court emphasized that the statute's limitations
upon the participation of school officials in student religious groups was instrumental in the failure to
find that the Act worked an establishment of religion. Id. at 251.
118. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
119. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988), where the Court notes the criticism that
the "'entanglement' prong" has received due to the "Catch-22" situation caused by necessary govern-
mental monitoring of its programs to ensure that they "comport[] with the Establishment Clause,"
which itself may cause a governmental entanglement under the third prong of the Lemon test.
120. See, for example, Presiding Bishop, where the Court held it constitutional to exempt solely
religious organizations from complying with anti-discrimination requirements in Title VII. 483 U.S.
327. When confronted with situations where federal policies advantage religious organizations by
treating them differently than secular organizations, such as exempting them from tax liability or from
compliance with anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII, the Court has found the differential treat-
ment to lessen entanglement. Id. at 334 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 676).
However, even when the federal government provides grants to religious organizations for
secular public purposes such as services for and research into premarital adolescent sex and pregnancy
under the Adolescent Family Life Act, the Court has not found this to constitute entanglement under
Lemon. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 617. The Court determined that if a religiously affiliated organization
receives federal funds for public programs, this does not violate the Establishment Clause if the orga-
nization is not "pervasively sectarian." Id. at 616.
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test. The closure neither advances nor inhibits religion-it, like a
university's administrative policy merely provides preferred access to the
area to a religious group for one month, and unbridled access to non-reli-
gious groups for the balance of the year. Lastly, the closure does not fos-
ter excessive governmental entanglement, but rather frees Native Ameri-
cans from regulatory oversight of the Sun Dance and related ceremonies.
Superintendent Ligget's action is also within the latitude afforded
governmental authorities under the evolving Establishment Clause juris-
prudence. This made clear in light of Justice Kennedy's proposed coercion
test and Justice O'Connor's proposed endorsement test for administering
the Establishment Clause.'21 Indeed, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
whose decisions are binding upon the Federal District Court of Wyoming,
has apparently adopted the emerging endorsement test as its guiding stan-
dard for evaluating Establishment Clause cases.'"
2. Justice Kennedy's Proposed Coercion Test
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority in Lee v. Weisman"23
identified the palpable presence of government coercion as the key ele-
ment of a claim under the Establishment Clause. In Lee, Justice Kennedy
emphasized the context of governmental action in determining whether
individuals were somehow coerced to support religious beliefs, by distin-
guishing between a state-sponsored prayer at a high school graduation and
a blessing at the opening of a state legislative session. 4
When a rabbi delivered a state-provided high school graduation
prayer, Justice Kennedy found that the students, though they were not
required to attend the graduation to receive their diplomas, were nonethe-
less coerced into participating in or supporting the religious ideas ex-
pressed in the prayer.'" Justice Kennedy's context-sensitive governmen-
tal coercion standard detected an Establishment Clause violation because
of the importance of high school graduation in United States culture as
"one of life's most significant occasions. ' '""s He concluded that the local
government, by supplying this prayer was "exact[ing] religious conformity
from a student as the price of attending her own high school gradua-
121. See infra notes 123-138 and accompanying text.
122. Defendants' Brief, supra note 17, at 19 (citing Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214 (10th
Cir. 1996) and noting that court also uses Lemon test).
123. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
124. Id. at 596-97 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), where a chaplain's blessing
at the opening day of Nebraska Legislature was found not to violate the Establishment Clause).
125. Lee, 505 U.S. at 593.
126. Id. at 595.
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tion. ' " Therefore, the student's silent participation in this religious ac-
tivity was coerced through school supervision and peer pressure to which
high school students are especially sensitive.
By comparison, Justice Kennedy's context-sensitive government
coercion standard found no Establishment Clause violation where the state
sponsored a prayer at the opening session of the Nebraska state legisla-
ture. 9 Given that the affected legislators, who were adults "not readily
susceptible to 'religious indoctrination,"..30 or "peer pressure"' were
free to enter and leave the chamber, and the opening prayers were not of a
proselytizing nature, Kennedy held that there was little likelihood that any
ostensible governmental coercion would effectively overwhelm the
legislators' personal capacity for religious choice or autonomy of be-
lief.'
3. Justice O'Connor's Proposed Endorsement Test
Justice O'Connor's variant of a new Establishment Clause test would
bar only governmental action that endorses a particular religion or reli-
gious practice. She would hold that governmental endorsement of particu-
lar religious beliefs or conduct violates the Establishment Clause because
"it sends a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, [and] not full
members of the political community, and [it sends] an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, [as] favored members of the
political community."' 3  Thus, Justice O'Connor determined that reli-
gious symbols displayed on or within governmental buildings were an
unconstitutional endorsement of religion because of the centrality of these
buildings as cites of government power and because the appearance of
governmental endorsement results.3 4 This endorsement is not as pro-
nounced in public parks, where the nature of the surroundings is inher-
ently public. Thus, religious symbols in public parks have not been found
to constitute governmental endorsement of a particular religious belief
system or dogma. 3
127. Id. at 596.
128. Id. at 593.
129. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. at 794-95.
130. Id. at 792 (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971) and Colo v. Treasurer &
Receiver Gen., 392 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (Mass. 1979)).
131. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (citing School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 290
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
132. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95.
133. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (citing
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
134. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 623-37 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment).
135. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Under her governmental endorsement of religion test, O'Connor
would permit governmental programs that give religious students equal
access to governmental funding 3 ' and supported religious groups' use of
public schools.37 These she would categorically define as governmental
acts that do not endorse any particular religion or dogmatic set of beliefs.
Justice O'Connor's endorsement standard would prohibit only those gov-
ernmental acts that actively promote or advantage particular religious
organizations or politically privilege a particular set of religious be-
liefs. 38
The proposed closure of Devils Tower violates neither the coercion
nor the endorsement test. Native American religious practitioners do not
proselytize, nor will their practices create a coercive environment that
would cause spectators to be compelled to participate. Moreover, the pres-
ence of Native Americans performing religious ceremonies at Devils Tow-
er could not reasonably cause observers to feel as though Native Ameri-
cans are full members of the political community, but the spectators are
not; thus, no governmental endorsement would occur.
C. The Theoretical Inconsistencies of Judge Downes'
Free Exercise Jurisprudence
Judge Downes' ironic invocation of the Supreme Court's free exer-
cise accommodation doctrine as limiting Superintendent Liggett's discre-
tionary authority to preserve Native Americans' cultural access to Devils
Tower further shows his mistaken interpretation of First Amendment juris-
prudence.'39 His interpretation of the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses in the Bear Lodge litigation stems from a fundamental misreading
of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n"' and Badoni v.
Higginson.
4 1
Both Lyng and Badoni, rightly understood, affirm the religious ac-
commodation principle as the governmental means of reconciling the
potentially conflicting mandates contained in the Establishment.and Free
Exercise Clauses. In Badoni, Native American plaintiffs claimed that the
completion of the Glen Canyon Dam and the consequent creation of Lake
136. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2525-28 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
137. See, e.g, Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., for the majority).
138. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 712-21 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
139. Order, supra note 11, at 7-10.
140. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
141. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
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Powell, as well as the growing tourist presence at Rainbow Bridge, de-
stroyed and desecrated their sacred sites, in violation their rights under the
Free Exercise Clause. 42 The district court granted summary judgment for
the governmental defendants because the Native American plaintiffs had
no property interest in the monument, and their free exercise interest was
not as strong as the federal government's interest in operating both the
Dam and the Rainbow Bridge Park." On appeal, the Tenth Circuit re-
jected the district court's first basis for granting summary judgment, stat-
ing that though property rights have been considered as one factor in a
free exercise determination, the focus of such an inquiry should be wheth-
er "the government [has] manage[d] property in a manner that does not of-
fend the constitution."'" Nonetheless, the court found that the federal
government had a compelling interest in managing the Dam and the Park
in a manner consistent with over-all federal objectives that outweighed the
appellee's interest in free exercise in the area. 45
The Tenth Circuit's desultory discussion of the Establishment Clause
stemmed from the plaintiffs' attempt to bar all visitors from the park,
year-round." In dicta, the court opined that if the plaintiffs were found
to have a free exercise right which would compel the federal government
to restrict all visitor access, then such a complete closure may constitute a
governmentally sponsored establishment of religion. 47 Given that the
Bear Lodge litigation raises the issue of whether the federal government
may discretionarily preserve Native Americans' cultural access to their
sacred sites on public lands, through a periodic closure, pursuant to the
agency's statutorily imposed preservation duties, the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion in Badoni offers little guidance.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n'" represents
the controlling law regarding public land managers' duty and power to
protect Native Americans' cultural and ceremonial access to sacred sites
on public lands. There, the Court majority agreed with the Native Ameri-
can plaintiffs that the proposed governmental action would fundamentally
impair, perhaps even destroy, the exercise of their religious ceremonies
and practices at sacred sites within the high country of Northern Califor-
142. 455 F. Supp. 641, 643 (D. Utah 1977).
143. Id. at 644-45.
144. 638 F.2d at 176.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 178-79.
147. See id. at 179 (emphasis added). Protecting Indian religious practices from curiosity seekers,
casual observers, and administrative rules and regulations is the only practical way that religious free-
dom can be assured to Indian tribes and Native groups. It is not the establishment of their religion
because their religions, not being proselytizing religions, seek to preserve the ceremonies, rituals and
beliefs not to spread them.
148. 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (O'Connor, J. writing for the majority).
[Vol. 18
1997] DEVILS TOWER AT THE CROSSROADS 35
ria." The Lyng majority further found that the North American Indian
Cemetery Protective Association had an interest in the pristine nature of
the National Forest land in .question, but held that the interest was not
great enough to override the government's interest in developing the
area.15o
The Lyng court effectively lowered the level of Free Exercise scrutiny
of governmental activity that involves a public land manager's routine or
internal decisions in allocating public resources among permissible land
use purposes.' Thus, any incidental burden on plaintiffs' religious prac-
tices that arose from these otherwise routine public land management
decisions did not rise to the level of a Free Exercise Clause violation. The
Lyng Court held that the accommodation of free exercise did not require
the government to regulate its lands other than the way the executive
agency saw fit, in the tradition of the sometimes tremendous deference
given to other branches of government in this area. 2 This deference to
public land manager authority is counter-balanced by the Court's declara-
149. IL at 451.
150. Id. at 451-52.
151. 485 U.S. at 452. This departure from the strict scrutiny of the compelling governmental
interest test and balancing tests for governmental activity that burdens, even indirectly, religious prac-
ice has, in the mind of some commentators, singled out native religion for markedly different and
disadvantageous treatment. In an article written soon after the Supreme Court's holding in Lyng, Scott
Hardt concluded that the Ninth Circuit Court in particular had, with the exception of its addition of
both a centrality and a coercion inquiry to its analysis, accurately adopted the extant precedent by
applying a strict scrutiny test to the Forest Services' proposed actions. See Hardt, supra note 18, at
640-41 (referring to Lyng, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985)). Hardt found that the Supreme Court's abrupt
change of course from this compelling interest test (and a somewhat more obscure balancing test) to
an inquiry into whether a burden upon religion is prohibitive or "merely" preventative, was a tremen-
dous shift from an inquiry into the legitimacy of governmental action to an inquiry into the centrality
of the practice to the religion. Id. at 651-57. This changed focus caused disparate and unfavorable
treatment which belied the Court's claimed even-handedness. The result failed to ensure the equal
standing of various religions by foreclosing Native Americans' ability to attain hegemonic dominion
over public lands, or religious servitudes, but instead resulted in a facially uneven analysis. Id. at 657.
Hardt concludes that the result of this changed analysis-which requires that governmental
actions cause individuals to violate tenets of their religion, or penalize individuals for religious exer-
cise--not for restricting access to a place of worship-burdens Native American religion much more
than western religion. In view of the doctrinal importance of place in Native American religion, in
contrast to that of event commemoration in western traditions, the test discriminates against native
worship. Id. at 653-57.
152. Lyng, 485 U.S. 439. The majority states that the courts are not equipped to "reconcile the
various competing demands on government, many of them rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevi-
tably arise in so diverse a society as ours." Id. at 452. The Court instead relegates "[t]hat task, to the
extent that it is feasible, [to] the legislatures and other institutions." Id. See also Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (Court effectively exempted the military from free exercise claims
when it subordinated the plaintiff's right to wear a yarmulke to the military's compelling interest in
uniformity); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (Court used intermediate scrutiny
to determine that prison regulations that infringed upon prisoners' prayer schedules were "reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests").
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tion that "nothing in our opinion should be read to encourage governmen-
tal insensitivity to the religious needs of any citizen.' ' 3 Thus, Justice
O'Connor suggests, "[t]he Government's rights to the use of its own land,
for example, need not and should not discourage it from accommodating
religious practices like these engaged in by the Indian respondents."'54
Superintendent Liggett's regulatory action implements the Lyng deci-
sion by preserving the Native Americans' traditional cultural access to a
well-established sacred site at Devils Tower. Though her action does rep-
resent a clear break with the majority culture's traditional hostility to
Native American culture and religion,'55 it also effectuates a permissible
interpretation of her statutory preservation duties consistent with the Lyng
accommodation principle. Public land managers may, under Lyng, consider
Native American cultural access to sacred sites in their revision of their
land use or management plans. Superintendent Liggett's action shows that
the federal government's ethnocentric disregard of Native American cul-
ture and religion need not continue to rule the National Park Service's
decision-making process.
D. Historical Inconsistencies of Judge Downes' Interpretation of
the Establishment Clause
Judge Downes' historical error lies in a misapplication of the Estab-
lishment Clause as a means to analyze core Native American cultural
practices using an alien system of laws and conduct. Granted, the Framers
of our Constitution themselves differed fundamentally regarding the mean-
ing attributable to that great "constitutional experiment" to balance reli-
gious rights and liberties. Their range of opinions on the issue of religious
liberty spanned the spectrum of contemporary opinion and reflected the
idealism of the eighteenth century theologians as well as the skepticism of
pragmatic contemporary philosophers.'56 Though a reduction of the myri-
ad philosophical motivations of the Framers is difficult if not impossible,
they may be categorized into the representative viewpoints of puritan,
civic republican, evangelical and enlightenment traditions.'57
153. Id. at 453.
154. Id. at 453-54.
155. Compiled exhaustively by Sharon O'Brien, these policies include Protestant proselytization
and conversion, the Bureau of Indian Affairs' reliance upon missionaries and other arms of the Chris-
tian church in efforts to assimilate Native Americans, extermination of the buffalo, and the
criminalization of Native American cultural practices. O'Brien, supra note 28, at 454-55.
156. John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitu-
tional Experiment, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 371, 376 (1996).
157. Accordingly, Witte acknowledges the fluid relationship between these perspectives and
recognizes that he has identified only these four categories for ease of analysis. Id. at 377. Witte goes
on to note the limited utility of the search for the "original intent of the drafters," noting that James
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Although coming from vastly differing ideological foundations, these
four distinct viewpoints united in their common advocacy of the adoption
of the Establishment Clause so as to guarantee a separation of church and
state that would prevent the persecution of religious minorities."' But it
was not the position of any of these traditions to establish an antagonistic
relationship between governmental and religious communities in Ameri-
ca.'59 Instead they commonly supported a vision of cooperation between
an autonomous government and a vibrant, but private sphere of religious-
ly-motivated activity. 6
This overlapping consensus among otherwise sharply divergent reli-
gious views evidenced the importance of spiritual devotion in citizens'
private lives. This consensus of views likewise sought an effective consti-
tutional means by which to constrain the federal government from impos-
ing a particular sort of worship which would lead to the oppression, cor-
ruption and taxation of the people.'
The Framers were mindful of the religious persecution experienced
by their ancestors in Europe in the form of forced participation in the state
religion. The state religion of England in the three centuries before the
American Bill of Rights was drafted was alternatively Protestant and Cath-
olic, according to the religious inclinations of the sovereign." 3 The
ruling government-established sect subjected English citizens to fines,
imprisonment, torture, and death for such offenses as "speaking disrespect-
fully of the views of... government-established churches, non-attendance
at those churches, expressions of non-belief in their doctrines, and failure
to pay taxes and tithes to support them."'' 1
Madison had "urged interpreters to look not to the drafters' intentions," but, "to the text itself [and]
the sense attached to it by the people in their respective State Conventions, where it received all the
authority which it possesses." Id.




162. Cheryl A. Hance, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia: Will the
Real Establishment Clause Test Please Stand Up?, 5 WmENER . PUB. L. 549, 555-59 (1996).
163. Hance places the beginning of this unrest at 1534, when Parliament ended the Roman Cath-
olic Church's control over England and declared King Henry VIII the head of the Church of England.
Id. at 555-56. This constituted a dramatic change for a population that was predominantly Catholic.
Dissention of any kind was harshly suppressed. King Henry's reign was followed by that of his daugh-
ter, Mary, who re-established Catholicism as the state religion, thereby launching a religious clash that
would last for the next century and a half. Id.
164. Id. at 556-57 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 9 (1947)). Sen-
sitive to the power of the church, the colonists, when assessed taxes to support the churches within the
colonies, determined that freedom of religion could only be secured if the government were "stripped
of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions." Id. at 557-58 (quoting
Everson, 330 U.S. at 11).
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Understandably, the Framers wanted to ensure that this could not
occur in an America built on the principle of religious tolerance." Thus,
James Madison, one of the premier architects of our Constitution and Bill
of Rights, asserted when enacting the Establishment Clause that the people
were concerned about the possibility that "one sect might obtain a preemi-
nence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which they
would compel other[s] to conform."" Madison was joined in this con-
cern by Thomas Jefferson, who had helped draft the Virginia Establish-
ment bill, and who tacitly acknowledged that the threat of governmental
coercion to practice minority religion was minimal, and consequently
minority religions in particular were intended by the Establishment Clause
to be protected from state-sponsored suppression." 7
Although modem Establishment Clause scholarship has challenged
the interpretive force that should be accorded to the relatively sparse indi-
cations of the Framers' intent on this issue, especially in view of the en-
actment of the Fourteenth Amendment,e6 governmental protection of re-
ligious minorities has remained the touchstone principle of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause since 1947." Al-
165. Id. at 557-59. James Madison and Thomas Jefferson passionately championed the battle
against this type of governmental power. Madison believed there was "not a shadow of [a] right in the
general government to intermeddle with religion." Id. at 558. Jefferson believed that "a wall of separa-
tion" between the church and the state was the only way to maintain a just government. Id.
166. Rodney K. Smith, Nonpreferentalism in Establishment Clause Analysis: A Response to
Professor Laycock, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 245, 259 (1991) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (J. Gales
ed., 1789)).
167. Witte, supra note 156, at 372 n.2, citing Thomas Jefferson, Notes for a Speech in the Vir-
ginia House of Delegates, in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 537-39 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950)
(arguing that the 1785 Virginia statute establishing religious freedom "meant to comprehend, within
the mantle of its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and the Mahometan, the Hindoo
[sic], and Infidel of every denomination").
168. The Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment Clause as against the states without
fanfare in Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). However, the decision did not
settle the controversy over the appropriate interpretation of the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment's
passage upon the Establishment Clause. Kurt Lash, The Second Adoption of The Establishment Clause:
the Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1085, 1141-42 (1995). Nevertheless, the
Court's incorporation of the Establishment Clause opened the door to inquiries pertaining to equal
protection and due process, not just when assessing whether the government has infringed a free exer-
cise interest, but also when assessing whether individuals are to be afforded a differing level of protec-
tion from an Establishment Clause violation when governmental activity is supportive of minority
religion. Michael J. Mannheimer, Equal Protection Principles and the Establishment Clause: Equal
Participation in the Community as the Central Link, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 95, 118-19 (1996).
169. In 1947, the Court decided Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, in which it
adopted an analysis of the establishment of religion grounded in the principle of separationism. The
Court supported this interpretation by relying upon only two commentators: Jefferson, who did not
participate in the framing or adoption of the Establishment Clause, and Madison who, though he did
participate in its ratification, was only one of the original framers. John Joiner, Note, A Page of Histo-
ry or a Volume of Logic?: Reassessing the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 73
DENv. U. L. REV. 507, 555 (1996). In so doing, the Court ignored the limited governmental tolerance
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though the Court has never settled on a consistent interpretive standard for
Establishment Clause administration, Justice Scalia has recently affirmed
an interpretation of the Establishment Clause's objective of protecting reli-
gious minorities."'
The Supreme Court's current accommodation principle from Lyng
bridges the governmental gap that historically rendered Native Americans'
cultural practices vulnerable to government-sponsored persecution and
suppression. By encouraging public land managers' to voluntarily consider
Native American cultural access in their land use and management plan-
ning, the Court once again voted for a workable accommodation in the
public land law context between the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses. Superintendent Liggett's action, under Lyng's guidance, repre-
sents a practical and rational means by which public land managers can
balance non-Indian recreational uses of public resources and Native
Americans' demand for cultural access to their historic sacred sites such as
Devils Tower.
E. Why a Strict Separationist Interpretation of the Establishment Clause
Frustrates the Preservation of Native American Cultural Resources
Judge Downes' strict separationist reading of the Establishment
Clause transforms it into a doctrine without boundaries. His interpretation
virtually abolishes any governmental opportunity to accommodate Native
Americans' cultural or ceremonial uses of our nation's public lands. Under
Downes' holding, any adversely affected public recreational user may veto
the government's accommodation of Native Americans' ceremonial or
cultural uses of public lands regardless of the minimal nature of the al-
leged injury suffered by that recreational user.'
of religion inherent in the support of the evangelical, civic republican, puritan and enlightenment
movements. The court also ignored the remaining Framers' intentions. Instead, the Court crafted an
absolutist test that makes compliance difficult to accomplish and hypocrisy hard to avoid. See Witte,
supra note 156, at 426-27.
170. Justice Scalia embraced this principle when dissenting from the majority's finding that the
New York legislature established government religion by creating a school district comprised entirely
of one sect of Hasidic Jews, to ensure funding for Hasidic children with special needs. See Kiryas
Joel, 512 U.S. at 732 (Scala, J., dissenting). He criticized the majority's application of the Establish-
ment Clause to this "minority sect" in view of the realistic scope of the Hasidic faith. Id. Scalia sug-
gests that the Hasidic community, rather than a religious organization with potential hegemonic power,
was a cultural grouping that became a political grouping through the act of the New York Legislature,
and consequently the Hasidics were beyond the scope of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 743
171. Judge Downes' interpretation of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses harks back to
the era when courts applied a rule that simultaneously "required and forbade" governmental accommo-
dation of minority religious practices. Garvey, supra note 52, at 1381 (comparing Sherbet v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) with Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) and suggesting a more toler-
ant approach).
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Further, his interpretation departs fundamentally from the religious
toleration principle that informs the contemporary Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause.' Public land managers, as well
as other governmental officials, will be crippled by Judge Downes' seem-
ingly unbounded catalogue of potential governmental accommodations of
minority religious practices or activities that amount to unlawful govern-
mental coercion of belief or direct governmental sponsorship of a particu-
lar religion." For example, Judge Downes' strict separationist interpreta-
tion of the Establishment Clause would seemingly outlaw a wide range of
existing governmentally supported religious activities-military chap-
lains," tax exemptions for churches, 75 and unemployment compensa-
tion for sabbatarians.'76
There is little to be gained by cannibalizing the governmental accom-
modation doctrine. That doctrine trusts the legislative branch to "balance"
the seemingly contradictory commands of the Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clauses via the reasonable governmental accommodation of minority
religious beliefs and practices. This accommodation is crucial in the Na-
tive American context, where governmental suppression of minority reli-
gious practices, not their accommodation, has been the rule.'"
But there are also compelling internal inconsistencies that counsel
against accepting Judge Downes' interpretation of the Establishment
Clause. First, Judge Downes' interpretation fails to impose any practical
restriction on the definitional reach of that key phrase, religious activity.
He does not explain his disregard of the federal government's uncontro-
verted ethnographic and historical evidence that establishes Native
Americans' long-standing cultural use, and not necessarily religious use, of
172. Religion, "viewed from the inside" of a minority religious community is about how one
lives a complete life in such a community. Legal or practical burdens on those religious practices don't
merely imply a lack of respect for those practices but make it much more difficult to "live the way
one ought to." Garvey, supra note 52, at 1382.
173. In addressing Jesse Choper's seperationist nonestablishment position that all tax support for
religious entities, for example, is violative of the Establishment Clause, Garvey, though he does not
concede, suggests that the current regime of private property interests make this a complex matter.
However, Garvey asserts that in a society wherein the government owns all the land, the government
would be compelled to support religious entities to fulfill its duty to accommodate religious free exer-
cise. Id. at 1385. Native Americans were compelled to cede their vast western land holdings to the
federal government, including many of their most important cultural and ceremonial sites. Absent
action by federal land managers to preserve Native American cultural access to these sites, Native
Americans will be in the position of perpetual supplicants to the federal government that has a virtual
monopoly on their cultural and religious resources. See id. at 1384-85.
174. Though the Court has never addressed this practice, the government may be arguably com-
pelled to provide the service to accommodate free exercise. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1157 (2d ed. 1988).
175. Upheld in Walz v. Tax Comm'n. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
176. Upheld in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
177. PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 1126.
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Devils Tower. Unlike his fellow judges or religious freedom scholars,
Judge Downes declines to meaningfully define "religious activity.' 7 In-
stead, he casually accepts the plaintiffs' characterization of the Native
Americans' cultural or ceremonial use of Devils Tower as tantamount to
religiously motivated activity.' 7
But Judge Downes' characterization of Native American ceremonial
activities, such as the Sun Dance, as equivalent to religious activity fails
the definitional test offered by perhaps the leading religious freedom
scholar in America.se Professor Jesse Choper argues that an action is
religious in nature if its practitioners intend it to have extra-temporal con-
sequences.' That is, Choper would define an activity as "religious" if it
"extends in some meaningful way beyond [the actor's lifetime], either by
affecting [her] eternal existence or by providing a permanent and everlast-
ing place in reality for all persons that follow."'" The well-documented
nature of the Sun Dance ceremony, and the related Native American cer-
emonial practices that are at stake in the Devils Tower litigation, dem-
onstrates that it is fundamentally non-commemorative in character and
non-salvation directed. Thus, those Native American cultural ceremo-
nies that Judge Downes characterizes as essentially religious in purpose
fail to meet Professor Choper's rather narrow reading of the Establishment
Clause.'
Other religious freedom scholars likewise demand a well-bounded
judicial definition of religious activity because an its converse would
conflate that sphere so as to include the broad and amorphous category of
private ideological convictions that are independently protected under the
Free Speech and Association Clauses of the constitution." g Judge
Downes ignores the fact that Superintendent Liggett's regulatory action
was motivated in part to preserve the important culturally affiliative prac-
tices of the inter-tribal Native American ceremonial users of Devils Tower.
178. Judge Downes simply concludes that no "legitimate distinction can be drawn in this case
between the 'religious' and 'cultural' practices of those American Indians who consider Devils Tower
a sacred site." See Order, supra note 11, at 3.
179. Id.
180. Defining religious activity is especially important in the governmental accommodation
context because the Supreme Court strives to provide reasonable latitude for the protection of minority
religious practices. Garvey, supra note 52, at 1383-84.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Getches asserts that Native American ceremonial and cultural practices "remain exotic and
incomprehensible to the courts... He further criticizes the imposed Anglo-American dichotomy of
"religion" versus "culture" as fundamentally misleading when applied to Native American ceremonial
and cultural practices and belief systems. See GETCHES Er AL., supra note 25, at 740.
184. Garvey, supra note 52, at 1383-84.
185. Id. at 1381.
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F. Summary
Judge Downes' interpretation of the "religious activity" and "govern-
mental coercion" elements of the Establishment Clause threatens the
Framers' dual commitment to a principle of religious tolerance and a
vibrant sphere of private religious activity. Native American ceremonial
activities at Devils Tower, regarded by expert ethnographers as primarily
culturally affiliative activities, are uncritically swept up into his definition
of religious activity. Downes then leverages his definition into an Estab-
lishment Clause violation by concluding that Superintendent Liggett's
periodic closure of Devils Tower to commercial rock climbing amounts to
illegal government coercion of private religious belief. If his interpretation
stands, long-standing relationships between the National Park Service and
mainstream religious organizations may well be jeopardized.
V. CONSIDERING AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR PRESERVING
NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL RESOURCES IN THE 21ST CENTURY
The Devils Tower litigation progressed to a hearing before Judge
Downes on April 18, 1997, on the plaintiffs' request for a permanent
injunction to prevent the National Park Service from implementing its
proposed Final Climbing Management Plan."s  Regardless of the deci-
sion reached, disputes over Native Americans' right of cultural access to
ceremonial or sacred sites on public lands will undoubtedly grow as public
land managers seek to implement their newly acknowledged cultural pres-
ervation duties. At this time, we propose an alternative analytical frame-
work that may help avoid, or at least moderate, these expected disputes
between non-Native American recreational or other public lands user
groups and Native American ceremonial practitioners.
This framework has two elements: 1) Legal: The public land
managers' duty to preserve Native Americans' right of cultural access
should be scrutinized under the rational basis test declared by the Supreme
Court in Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks,' and 2) Policy:
186. This on-going litigation continues to provoke heated editorial comment, pro and con. The
editorial page editor for the Casper Star-Tribune, Mr. Charles Levendosky, charged the NPS with
"capitulating" to the Mountain States Legal Foundation "even before the full merits of the case were
argued," by recently amending its climbing management plan to remove the mandatory ban on com-
mercial rock climbing during the month of June. Mr. Levendosky criticized the agency as advocating a
"double standard" of religious accommodation: a mandatory closure to public visitors of selected
Christian religious sites during religious services, such as the Ebenezer Baptist Church where Martin
Luther King, Jr. was co-pastor with his father (now a National Historic Site), while requesting only
voluntary compliance by commercial and recreational rock climbers during the Native Americans'
religious or ceremonial services at Devils Tower. See, Charles Lendosky, Respecting Sacred Sites:
Why Not Accommodate Indians at Devils Tower as We Accommodate Christians Elsewhere?, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEws, May 18, 1997, at lB, 5B.
187. 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (holding that distribution of government funds to enrolled tribal
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Judicial review of federal agencies' actions to preserve Native Americans'
right of cultural access or cultural resources should be limited to the
court's assessment of the agency's asserted rational nexus between the
identified Native American cultural resource and its proposed action that
will preserve that resource from potential destruction or unacceptable
injury by a competing use.
A. Law: The Judicial Review Standard that Should Govern Federal
Agency Action to Preserve Native American Cultural Resources
In Bear Lodge, the private commercial climbing litigants failed to
address the -federal government's judicially imposed trust duty to preserve
the Native Americans' cultural resources. This omission ignores Congress'
recent amendments to several of the existing federal cultural and historical
preservation statutes to include the protection of Native American gov-
ernments and their cultural resources."' Indeed, it was Superintendent
Liggett's interpretation of the National Historic Preservation Act as well as
other controlling federal legislation that prompted her to develop the
FCMP to further protect Native Americans' historic cultural access to
Devils Tower.'"
These federal preservation statutes may impose substantive as well as
procedural duties on public land managers to incorporate Native
Americans' cultural resources in their project planning and in the adoption
or revision of resource management plans."9 Superintendent Liggett ex-
ercised her discretion in carrying out her cultural preservation duty so as
to preserve Native Americans' cultural access to Devils Tower. The gov-
erning statute directs her to preserve the historic customs, traditions and
life-ways of local communities that are inextricably intertwined with the
protected physical resoure.191 Given the overwhelming ethnographic and
historic data that confirmed extensive Native American ceremonial use of
Devils Tower, her action to preserve the Native Americans' right of cul-
tural access would seem a reasonable interpretation of her statutory duties.
A well developed body of judge-made Indian trust law provides the
framework for evaluating federal agency action that seeks to preserve
Native Americans' statutorily protected cultural resources. These judge-
made principles prescribe both the appropriate standard and scope of judi-
cial review of federal agency action that purports to preserve Native
members only did not violate Equal Protection Clause because the decision was "fied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians").
188. See Stem & Slade, supra note 50, at 136-38.
189. FCMP, supra note 8, at 5.
190. See Stem & Slade, supra note 50, at 138-39.
191. See id. (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433).
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Americans' cultural resources, including their cultural access to significant
ceremonial or sacred sites on public lands."
The trust doctrine defines the parameters of the suis generis legal and
political relationship between Native American peoples and the federal
government. From its judicial construction in the Court's 1831 and 1832
companion cases, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia... and Worcester v. Geor-
gia,194 this doctrine has been applied to require the federal executive to
act as trustee for the Native American property. 95 It has also resulted in
a finding that the federal government has plenary power over Indian peo-
ples and their resources derived from an extra-constitutional federal power
that was not constrained, presumably, by the First Amendment and the
other special guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights."9
Though the plenary power doctrine has been weakened by the Su-
preme Court, federal legislation exercising this power remains subject only
to the rational basis standard of judicial review."9 Applying this standard
of judicial review to Superintendent Liggett's action, a reviewing federal
court may only "ascertain the basis for [for the federal agency's] decision,
given the possible presence of divided loyalty and to determine whether
the decision is consistent with the Secretary's fiduciary duties to his Indian
beneficiaries."'' 8 But that federal court must accept Superintendent
Liggett's plausible rationale for concluding that her proposed action will
tend to preserve the Native Americans' statutorily protected cultural re-
sources. A leading Indian law commentator concludes that a reviewing
federal court must "sustain the [federal agency's] action and avoid further
inquiry so long as it was a reasonable one for a fiduciary.'
Superintendent Liggett's action to preserve the Native Americans'
192. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 225-28 (1982 ed.).
193. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
194. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
195. Modem courts have held the federal executive branch to the standard of civil trustee. For
example, in Pyramid Lake Pauite Tribe of Indians v. Morton, the Secretary of the Interior attempted to
balance the water rights of the Bureau of Reclamation with the treaty fishing rights of the tribe. 354 F.
Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972) The court determined that the executive's duty as trustee imposed, as it does
in other trust situations, a fiduciary duty upon the executive:
The United States, acting through the Secretary of Interior, 'has charged itself with moral
obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct.., should therefore be
judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.' The Secretary was obliged to... pre-
serve water for the Tribe. He was further obliged to assert his statutory and contractual
authority to the fullest extent possible to accomplish this result
354 F. Supp. at 256 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942)).
196. See Kagama v. United States, 118 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1886).
197. See Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. at 85.
198. Reid P. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27
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cultural access to their significant ceremonial sites at Devils Tower would
seemingly meet the Indian trust rational basis standard. The administrative
record details the adverse environmental and cultural impacts imposed by
unregulated recreational rock climbers' use of Devils Tower. ° That
same administrative record contains substantial and uncontroverted
ethnographic and historical data that confirms the Native Americans' sig-
nificant cultural interest in that site.01 These factors certainly comprise a
rational basis.
B. Policy: Native American Cultural Resources Represent a Vital Part of
Our Common National Heritage
Cultural resources represent the key resource of a viable, sustainable
society or people. Leading cultural anthropologists and legal scholars
agree that contemporary Native American societies require a defined legal
and physical "space" to ensure the viability of their future cultural and
associational existence.' ° Federal Indian policy of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries sought to destroy these peoples by restricting
them to geographically small reservations and by suppressing their historic
ceremonial and cultural practices. Superintendent Liggett and like-minded
public land managers, should be encouraged by the judiciary to carry out
their statutory preservation duties in a manner that accords with our
society's re-valuation of Native Americans' cultural resources, and values
cultural resources as a vital and necessary part of our larger, shared cultur-
al life as a great, multi-cultural nation.
200. FCMP, supra note 8, at 10-13.
201. Id.
202. Sovereignty "is a means by which indigenous peoples can assert some degree of control
over the form, content and direction of their individual and collective identities." Patrick Macklem,
Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1347
(1993).
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